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ABSTRACT
This article examines the dominant conception of world order in India’s 
post-Cold War foreign policy discourse. Drawing on a poststructuralist, 
discourse-theoretical framework, I argue that the discourse uses foreign 
policy and world order as sites for the (re-)production of India’s identity 
by placing India into a system of differences that constitutes ‘what India 
is’. The article shows that India’s foreign policy discourse frames world 
order in accordance with India’s own national experiences and thus 
seeks to upheave India’s identity to a position from where it can repre-
sent the universal: a global political community. This notion of Indian 
Exceptionalism constitutes the affective dimension of the discourse that 
obscures the absence of an extra-discursive foundation on which 
national identities could be grounded by endowing the Self with an 
imaginary essence and seemingly unique qualities.
Introduction
The rise of so-called emerging powers such as China, India or Brazil is believed to transform 
the international system and to pose a challenge to the Western-liberal world order.1 All 
too often, however, the ‘global power shifts’ literature derives their future political clout 
directly from their growing economic (and military) capabilities, thus suggesting that the 
possession of certain material characteristics will automatically lead to a particular foreign 
policy behaviour. This rather materialistic and deterministic reading also reflects the 
Western-centrism of international relations (IR),2 which attributes to non-Western states 
often only an inferior agency and neglects the way in which these states conceptualise 
and practise world politics. Against this backdrop, this article examines how the foreign 
policy discourse of India – a state located outside the Western ‘core’ and widely believed 
to be emerging as an influential power pole – endows world order with meaning and 
constitutes India’s identity in this order.
Though India’s ‘rise’ has attracted much scholarly attention,3 there exists no systematic, 
theory-led study on Indian world order models in the IR literature. Hence, it remains unclear 
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how India will engage and shape the world order. While some scholars claim that India has 
no world order concept or guiding foreign policy frameworks in the post-Cold War era,4 
Sagar and Bajpai claim that there are various distinct schools of strategic thought that inform 
India’s contemporary foreign policy.5 However, they provide no analytical framework that 
would make transparent how they identified these schools and explain what their ontological 
status is. For example, do these schools merely reflect the ‘reality’ of world politics or are they 
making this reality meaningful in the first place? In addition, Sagar and Bajpai rely to a great 
extent on texts by the leaders of India’s independence movement such as Nehru and prom-
inent policy commentators rather than studying the ‘worldviews’ of contemporary Indian 
policymakers. Nevertheless, both argue that a (neo)liberal school, which views non-alignment 
as obsolete and embraces economic pragmatism, globalisation and the promotion of India’s 
self-interests, shapes Indian foreign policymaking. This corresponds to the common assertion 
found in contemporary studies on Indian foreign policy which argue that India has shifted 
from Nehruvian ‘idealism’ to a foreign policy driven by ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism’.6
Though India gradually liberalised its economy and redefined its relations with the major 
powers, in particular with the uS, in the post-Cold War era, this reading cannot explain some 
significant continuities in Indian foreign policy such as the resilience of the notion of non-align-
ment or why India – despite its status as liberal democracy – is still rather hesitant in support-
ing the liberal international order.7 Constructivist studies explain this continuity and India’s 
role in global politics with reference to India’s identity as an ‘exceptional’ or ‘ambivalent’ actor 
that defies ‘great power politics’, ‘leads by the power of its example’ or is a ‘symbol of peaceful 
coexistence’.8 By studying how identities shape foreign policy, constructivist-inspired accounts 
run the risk of essentialising the concept of identity and re-producing nationalistic, ethno-
centric accounts of world politics which often come uncomfortably close to the official foreign 
policy orientations of the respective countries – a tendency, as critics point out,9 that we find 
in ‘Post-Western IR’10 in general and that might indicate the need for a more critical approach.
Drawing on a poststructuralist, discourse-theoretical approach, this article seeks to offer 
an alternative analytical framework that allows us to go beyond Western-centric IR by draw-
ing on Indian textual sources and examining how these texts conceptualise ‘world order’ 
without essentialising India or reproducing an Indo-centric account of world politics. From 
a poststructuralist point of view, identities and meanings are not given or stable but discur-
sively constructed and thus constituted against the difference of an other.11 Building on this 
insight, this article goes beyond a purely descriptive account of India’s conception of world 
order and investigates how the meaning of world order is constructed in India’s foreign 
policy discourse by analysing how the discourse relates the Indian Self to a series of others. 
Based on the discourse analysis of Indian foreign policy texts, the article identifies the dom-
inant discourse through which Indian policymakers have made sense of global politics in 
the post-Cold War era. This discourse can be characterised as post-Nehruvian in that it draws 
on established tenets of Indian foreign policy such as non-alignment but also goes beyond 
them. Instead of embracing a (neo)liberal worldview as often suggested, Indian policymakers 
rather sought to redefine existing foreign policy frameworks and adapt them to the global-
ised, post-Cold War world.
The post-Nehruvian discourse represents India not as a direct stakeholder of the Western-
liberal world order but as an independent, multi-aligned actor that should strive for a poly-
centric order. The discourse frames world order in accord with India’s national experiences 
and seeks to upheave India to a position from where it can claim to represent the universal: 
the possibility of a political community that can, despite its differences, live in peaceful 
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co-existence. This assertion is typically seen as an expression of Indian Exceptionalism which – 
like similar claims in other countries – attributes the nation a moral or cultural uniqueness 
and superiority.12 Given the purely relational character of identities, national identities are 
in permanent need of re-production and thus depend on difference. By understanding 
foreign policy as a practice that differentiates the Self from various international others, the 
discourse-analytical approach applied here shows how foreign policy and world order are 
used as sites for the re-production of a particular representation of Indian identity. As we 
will see, this explains why Indian policymakers simultaneously desire recognition of India 
by Western states but also seek to assert India’s autonomy. In addition, it sheds light on the 
ontological significance of the notion of Indian Exceptionalism discussed by constructivist 
scholars: The notion symbolises – what lacanian psychoanalytic theory13 calls – a fantasy 
through which discourses over mask the essential incompleteness of identities and ensure 
that the discursive character of (what we view as) social reality remains in the background. 
The fantasy of exceptionalism endows the Indian nation with an imaginary, transcendental 
essence by placing it into a seemingly coherent narrative and projecting everything that 
challenges this secure and stable sense of Self onto the other.
The article is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the article’s theoretical 
and methodological framework. In particular, it discusses the relationship between foreign 
policy, identity and discourse and introduces the logics-approach14 as guide for the discourse 
analysis. The second section sets out the main pillars of the post-Nehruvian conception of 
world order. The third section discusses how the discourse constitutes meanings and iden-
tities by relating Self and others, and the final section sketches the fantasmatic narrative of 
Indian Exceptionalism.
Discourse, foreign policy and world order
Building on Ernesto laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT), 
which breaks with the common distinction between a discursive (linguistic or ideational) 
and a non-linguistic (or material) realm, this article understands a discourse as a relational 
and differential system of signification that creates a field of intelligibility whereby a particular 
‘reality’ can be apprehended and acted upon.15 Accordingly, the meanings and identities of 
subjects/objects do not depend either on reference to a world ‘out there’ or on ideas we 
have about an external reality, but are the result of an ‘articulatory practice’ that establishes 
‘a relation among elements such that their identity is modified’ and creates a relational 
structure through which subjects, objects, words and actions become meaningful.16 However, 
given their relational and differential character, discourses can never ultimately fix meanings 
and are thus contingent and open for political contestation, because no articulation can 
exhaust all possible meanings a signifying element can obtain.17
Against this backdrop, a state is no pre-discursive entity with an objective essence or 
stable identity but constituted in relation to something that it is not – a shared negativity. 
By ‘demarcat[ing] an “inside” from an “outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a 
“foreign”’, as David Campbell has argued, foreign policy plays a crucial role in the constitution 
and re-production of a state’s identity.18 Antagonisms, however, do not symbolise the clash 
of social forces with already constituted – oppositional – identities and interests, but emerge 
from the very process of identity formation which always presupposes that there is an other 
against which this identity can be constructed.19 Foreign policy and identity mutually 
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constitute each other in that the formation of the identity is achieved through this bound-
ary-drawing practice, but the identity is simultaneously constructed as the legitimisation 
for the proposed policy.20
As states or nations have no essence, their identities are in permanent need of re-pro-
duction by differentiating the Self from a series of others. While poststructuralists have 
typically focussed on how identities are constructed against the difference of an other, 
lacanian psychoanalytic theory can illuminate the underlying dynamics that generate and 
sustain this process of othering. Accordingly, the lack of a stable, extra-discursive foundation 
on which our identities could be grounded (due to the purely relational character of iden-
tities) creates anxieties, insecurities and desires within the subject and motivates it to identify 
with a discourse that promises to fill this lack and provide the Self with a sense of wholeness, 
certainty and stability.21 This is captured by the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy. In contrast 
to the common understanding of fantasy as ‘illusion’ or ‘false consciousness’, fantasy denotes 
here the mechanisms through which the missing essence or fullness of subjects is concealed 
in discourses. A fantasy can be conceptualised as a distinctive form of narrative. It constructs 
a seemingly stable, natural or transcendental foundation on which the imaginary essence 
of the Self can be grounded (eg nature, religion or ancient epics) and places the Self in a 
linear, coherent story that is often characterised by an imaginary origin, a moment of purity, 
grandeur and perfection, which has been lost and must be recovered, or an ideal of a glorious, 
consummate future, whose realisation is blocked by something: the other.22 Hence, fantasies 
are not fictions that distort how things ‘really’ are, but obscure the discursive character of 
what we view as social reality by projecting the ontological lack onto the other and thereby 
promising the Self a state of wholeness once the other is overcome.
Given the absence of any foundations on which meanings and identities could be per-
manently stabilised, PDT highlights the struggle for discursive hegemony and thus how 
particular meanings could prevail as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ understandings of the world 
and become ‘common sense’. A hegemonic constellation has emerged, if a certain particu-
larity (of interests, demands, subjects, etc.) is represented as the universal in the sense that 
it is naturalised and the same reality is reflected in the discursive practices of all relevant 
actors.23
A world order is the outcome of a successful struggle for discursive hegemony through 
which a particular representation of world politics is upheaved to a (seemingly) universal 
status.24 laclau conceptualises the universal – in our case world order – as an ‘empty’ space 
or signifier in that it is overdetermined with (potential) meanings and ultimately unreach-
able,25 because it can only be filled by ‘a particular social force [that] assumes the represen-
tation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it’.26 Against this backdrop, this 
article examines how India’s dominant foreign policy discourse seeks to fill the empty signifier 
of world order with meaning by universalising India’s own particular experiences and identity. 
As we will see, this assertion has two objectives: first, the discourse uses foreign policy and 
world order as sites for the re-production of a particular representation of Indian identity: 
the notion of India as symbol of peaceful co-existence; second, it contests the Western dis-
cursive hegemony, which represents the West as the main political and normative agent in 
the world. By claiming that India has found a way for the peaceful contention of differences, 
the discourse aims to forge a counter-hegemonic project in which India is a crucial building 
block of a ‘true’ world order and thereby enhance India’s agency, status and power in global 
politics.
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For the analysis of India’s foreign policy discourse and its conception of world order, the 
article used a data corpus consisting of English-speaking, publicly available government 
and party documents, speeches, statements and publications by Indian policymakers and 
government advisers, and parliamentary debates. In total, the dataset comprised roughly 
11,000 documents. The period of investigation covers India’s entire post-Cold War foreign 
policy till spring 2014, when the tenure of the Congress-led government ended. The article 
will limit itself to (what was identified in the discourse analysis as) the hegemonic foreign 
policy discourse in India during this time period.
Drawing on the model of Logics of Critical Explanation put forward by Glynos and Howarth 
and applying it to the study of foreign policy, I distinguish among three different sets of 
logics underpinning discourses: social, political and fantasmatic. Generally, a logic captures 
the various conditions that make a social practice or order (ie a set of institutions, practices 
and identities) possible, ‘tick’ or ‘work’, and vulnerable.27 Social logics denote the content of 
a particular discourse and thus capture – in our case – what ‘world order’ means and implies 
for policymakers subscribing to this specific discourse. Political logics refer to the (re-)pro-
duction of meanings and identities in the discourse by relating the Self to a series of others. 
Fantasmatic logics capture how discourses seek to conceal their contingency and thus the 
missing essence of subjects. This enables us, inter alia, to comprehend why subjects desire 
to identify with a discourse and take it to be ‘real’. Fantasmatic logics can be analysed as 
narratives, ie simplified and mythical stories that order experiences by placing actors and 
events into a seemingly linear, coherent story in which everything that contradicts this linear 
story is excluded or projected onto the other.
For exploring what meaning is conferred to the signifier ‘order’ in India’s foreign policy 
discourse, the article initially searched in the textual material for appearances of the term 
‘order’ and analysed the context in which the term appeared. Words or signifiers acquire 
their meanings never out of themselves or by their composition, but only in relation to other 
signifiers. Context thus refers to the textual surroundings, ie the sentences or paragraphs in 
which a word is used, or other themes that the texts cover. In doing so, the discourse analysis 
could identify those words that are normally directly linked to the signifier ‘order’, namely 
‘multipolar order’ or ‘polycentric order’, and find signifiers that are frequently used in concor-
dance with the term ‘order’, such as ‘international scenario’, and extend the analysis to these 
signifiers. Then, it identified the words, themes or issues that these texts relate to ‘order’ and 
thereby discerned the elements or content of ‘order’ (eg state sovereignty or non-violence). 
Having identified the signifiers – or social logics – that are subsumed under the label of 
‘order’ in the body of texts, the article analysed their meaning by situating them in their 
respective textual context. For example, who or what is named as a threat or challenge to 
this ‘order’ and its main pillars, or what practices are associated with the logic?
By analysing a wide range of Indian foreign policy texts, the article sought to reconstruct 
the dominant interpretative framework through which Indian policymakers rather than 
scholars make sense of world order and India’s role in it. Instead of randomly selecting a 
limited number of documents or using standalone statements made by Indian policymakers, 
the article searched for general patterns in language use and thus for the inter-subjective 
meaning-systems that inform India’s conception of world order. At the same time, it goes 
beyond the mere study of these meaning-systems by examining how and why particular 
meanings have been constructed within the discourses. As discourses construct a field of 
intelligibility that delineates what can be meaningfully said and done, they give content to 
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India’s interests and condition possible policy options. This helps us, for instance, to under-
stand why Indian policymakers continued to use the rhetoric of non-alignment in the post-
Cold War era and why they do not see India as a direct stakeholder of the Western-liberal 
world order.
The post-Nehruvian discourse and world order
The post-Nehruvian discourse and its conception of world order can be characterised 
through five interrelated social logics: international unity in diversity, state sovereignty, 
enlightened self-interest, non-violence and non-discrimination. The discourse is articulated 
around the nodal point of strategic autonomy and constructs India as an independent and 
pluralist actor which should engage all major powers and pursue a policy of multi-align-
ment.28 Accordingly, India seeks partnerships with a wide range of states and cooperates 
with multiple actors in shifting coalitions and different issues areas, while avoiding strategic 
entanglements and one-sided dependencies.29 While the Nehruvian discourse linked 
non-alignment to the Cold War equation and India’s state-directed, socialist economic policy, 
the post-Nehruvian discourse, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, translates 
non-alignment into strategic autonomy and modifies its meaning by linking it to India’s 
policy of economic liberalisation and the new challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold 
War world. As then-foreign secretary Nirupama Rao explained in 2011:
driving our foreign policy priorities and our desire for strategic autonomy … [is] the need for 
sustained economic growth, our energy security, maritime security and of course access to 
technology and innovation to sustain our economic growth. … In order to modernise our 
country, we need to, and I believe we have succeeded in, forging well-rounded strategic rela-
tionships and partnerships with all the major powers.30
In contrast to the common assertion that the end of the Cold War ‘hammered the final 
nail in the coffin of non-alignment’,31 Indian policymakers believed that ‘the essence and 
logic of non-alignment’ – ie ‘the pursuit of an independent foreign policy’ – ‘have not changed 
but they have to be applied in a vastly transformed international landscape’.32 In this sense, 
the post-Nehruvian discourse neither marks a radical break with the past nor constructs a 
fundamentally different notion of world order. Rather, the discourse both draws on and goes 
beyond the Nehruvian discursive project, whereby it also attempts to generate political 
support for the changes in India’s economic and foreign policy.
The five different social logics through which world order is represented in the post-Neh-
ruvian discourse indicate what world order means and applies to those policymakers who 
draw on this discourse. The post-Nehruvian discourse seeks to establish a direct link between 
India’s identity and world order. Through the social logic of international unity in diversity, the 
discourse takes pluralism or polycentrism as the foundational and necessary condition of 
world order.33 Accordingly, a world order must ‘promote an ideology of holism, which 
embraces coexistence, plurality and tolerance’34 and provide an institutional framework that 
can accommodate global interdependence and multiple stakeholders with different cultures, 
political systems, interests and traditions. In this world order, states ‘coexist and cooperate 
with each other in a series of networked relationships, including bilateral and plurilateral 
strategic partnerships that often overlap with each other, rather than in fixed alliances or 
binary either/or antagonisms’.35 unlike multipolarity, a polycentric order is ‘profoundly 
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influenced by globalization’36 and ‘marked by the preponderance of several major powers, 
with minimal likelihood of direct conflict amongst these powers, but where both cooperation 
and competition among them are intense’.37
For the post-Nehruvian discourse, such a polycentric world resembles India in that it 
displays a similar diversity, heterogeneity and complexity like the Indian society and is con-
fronted with the same challenge: to accommodate differences. In this sense, the discourse 
grants India’s national experiences and identity based on the ideal of ‘unity in diversity’ 
universal significance and projects them onto the global order.38 As then-Prime Minister 
(PM) Manmohan Singh claimed, for example, in 2007:
This ‘idea of India’ is the idea of ‘unity in diversity’. The idea of pluralism, the idea that there 
need be no ‘conflict of civilizations’, the idea that it is possible for us to facilitate and work for a 
‘confluence of civilizations’. These ideas, I believe, have a universal, a truly global relevance. In a 
world enveloped by the darkness of conflict and hatred, these ideas come as rays of sunshine, 
lighting up our lives, giving us hope, renewing our faith in our common humanity.39
In this Indo-centric view, India becomes the symbol of world order, the possibility of a 
global political community, and naturally assumes a privileged role in global politics. The 
logic presupposes that India has a ‘diverse identity’, represents ‘multiple interests’ and can 
thus be ‘a unique bridge between different worlds’,40 because India is a non-Western, devel-
oping, post-colonial country, but at the same time a successful democracy in a multi-reli-
gious, multi-linguist and multi-ethnic state. This would make India a potentially attractive 
partner for a variety of countries, ranging from the united States to Iran, and allow India to 
pursue a policy of multi-alignment. Existing accounts of multi-alignment usually conceptu-
alise it as a rational strategy to achieve what Indian policymakers perceive as India’s core 
interests, values and security challenges and as a means to upheave India’s status in the 
world.41 While the post-Nehruvian discourse certainly represents multi-alignment as a ratio-
nal strategy to achieve these objectives, it also uses multi-alignment to establish a close link 
between Indian policies and identity in that foreign policy becomes a site for the re-produc-
tion of a particular notion of Indian identity: India is a pluralist and secular country that can, 
both in its domestic and international affairs, accommodate differences.
Though the post-Nehruvian discourse embraces the aspiration for an international polit-
ical community, it emphasises through the social logic of state sovereignty that the ‘nation-
state is still the basic unit of international security’; as then-national security adviser 
Shivshankar Menon stated in 2011, ‘[s]overeignty and territorial integrity remain the foun-
dation of the international system, as do traditional security concerns and zero-sum com-
petition between nation states’.42 A foreign policy informed by this logic highlights in 
particular the independence of decision-making. Major foreign policy debates in India (eg 
on the Indo–uS nuclear agreement), therefore, usually boil down to questions of national 
sovereignty and autonomy.43 In addition, the logic emphasises the non-interference into 
the internal affairs of other states and therefore opposes the newly emerging norm of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P).44 While acknowledging that the ‘responsibility to protect its 
population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every state’,45 the discourse opposes 
the third pillar of R2P that provides for coercive measures, fearing that the norm will be 
invoked by powerful states to gloss over the pursuit of brute self-interests and thus be used 
selectively and discriminatorily.46 However, while advocating a sovereignty-oriented foreign 
policy on the global level and demanding that India’s sovereignty is respected, the 
THIRD WoRlD QuARTERly 187
post-Nehruvian discourse’s commitment to the sovereign equality of states can – under 
certain circumstances – be overridden by the concerns and interests of major powers such 
as India in South Asia or Russia in its ‘near abroad’.47 Accordingly, smaller states cannot nec-
essarily claim full sovereignty in international relations.
This points to the social logic of enlightened self-interest which underpins the post-Neh-
ruvian discourse and characterises world politics as competitive and driven by the self-in-
terests of states. All states attempt to maximise their own interests and thus India too must 
be guided by its self-interest.48 India’s main self-interest is ‘to promote and maintain a peace-
ful and stable external environment in which the domestic tasks of inclusive economic devel-
opment and poverty alleviation can progress rapidly and without obstacles’.49 While the 
logic suggests that ‘India’s national interest must be protected to the fullest possible extent’,50 
it ‘enlightens’ the national interest by cautioning that the unrestrained pursuit of self-interests 
at the expense of the interests of other states would have devastating consequences for all 
states, including India.51 As then-External Affairs Minister (EAM) Salman Khurshid noted 
in 2012:
It is true that international relations are ultimately about your own welfare and it is about your 
own interest. But that same interest can be an enlightened self-interest or it can be a narrow 
self-interest. And I do believe that in spite of the changing balance between principles and 
pragmatism, India’s approach of enlightened self-interest survives.52
The social logic of non-violence serves as an ideal for the conduct of inter-state relations 
and endorses the peaceful settlement of conflicts – through dialogue, diplomacy, trade, 
people-to-people contacts, etc. – enshrined in the united Nations (uN) charter. The logic 
denies neither the existence of the reality of conflicts nor the continuing relevance of military 
force in international relations, but questions the inevitability of violence and its utility for 
conflict resolution.53 Though the logic of non-violence stipulates caution in acquiring and 
using military power, it does not rule out the use of force or discards the importance of 
conventional and nuclear deterrence. Hinting at the moralism in Nehru’s foreign policy, PM 
Singh noted in 2005, ‘international relations are ultimately power relations, based on real-
politik, not on sentiment. And howsoever, we may regret it, international relations are not 
a morality play’.54 Therefore, India must accumulate and maintain sufficient military capabil-
ities to protect it against potential threats, even though it should exercise strategic restraint 
when dealing with security challenges and recognise that ‘[p]rosperity and economic clout 
rather than war and aggression will be the key determinants of status in the world 
community’.55
The social logic of non-discrimination is another principle for the conduct of inter-state 
relations. It highlights the formally equal status of all states and opposes ‘all forms of political 
and economic hegemonism’56 found, for instance, in treaties or institutions that establish 
unequal relations among their members such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which, 
in the words of former EAM Jaswant Singh, created a situation of ‘nuclear apartheid … that 
arbitrarily decided on the nuclear haves and have-nots’.57 While the Nehruvian discourse 
viewed world politics mainly through the frame of a North/South divide, the post-Nehruvian 
discourse has differentiated the political space by representing India alongside countries 
such as China and Brazil as emerging economies that differ from both developing and devel-
oped countries: By invoking the notion of emerging economies, the discourse essentially 
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claims that India should sit at the ‘high table’ with the major powers but, at the same time, 
be treated as a developing country in global trade and climate governance and enjoy certain 
privileges such as the ‘principle of common but differentiated responsibility’ in the interna-
tional climate regime.58
Hence, the logic explicitly affirms discrimination in India’s favour and demands that the 
world recognise India’s status by giving India a permanent seat in the uN Security Council, or 
recognise India – despite its status as a non-signatory of the NPT – as a nuclear weapons state.59 
This dimension of the logic of non-discrimination suggests that India is interested less in 
‘equality for all’ but rather in shaping the international order in accord with its interests and 
using the allegation of discrimination to justify Indian demands and, potentially, to build 
coalitions with like-minded countries to increase its legitimacy, authority and bargaining power.
The constitutive Others in the post-Nehruvian discourse: political logics
While the discussion of social logics enabled us to shed light on what world order means or 
implies to Indian policymakers who draw on this discourse, political logics deal with the way 
that meanings and identities are constructed by relating the Self to a series of others. The 
post-Nehruvian discourse constitutes meanings and identities primarily in relation to colo-
nialism as temporal other and Pakistan and China as spatial-political others.
Colonialism symbolised a collective experience of domination, discrimination, exploita-
tion and suffering and served as a shared negativity for the formation of an Indian national 
identity. To recall, a nation or state has no given, organic identity or essence, but can only 
constitute itself and re-produce its identity when there is an other that can, at least partially, 
override internal differences (eg between Bengalis, Punjabis, communists, liberals, Hindus, 
Sikhs and Muslims) and present different identities, interests or demands as equivalent (in 
relation to the other). Hence, the other blocks or threatens the identity of the Self, but makes, 
at the same time, the (re-)production of this identity possible.60 By invoking colonialism as 
common negation, the post-Nehruvian discourse thus constitutes meanings and identities 
in opposition to India’s own past and recalls the ‘foundational moment’ of an Indian identity 
and what unites all Indians: their common opposition to foreign oppression, dictates, dis-
crimination, interferences and exploitation. As a result, the resilience of non-alignment or 
strategic autonomy in India’s foreign policy discourse does not merely embody a strategic 
choice or ideological position, but is closely intertwined with India’s identity and crucial for 
its re-production.
Though colonialism constitutes a temporal other in the discourse, it has also a spatial-po-
litical dimension in that it places India in opposition to contemporary forms of the colonial 
practices and relations listed above. This implies that the role of the colonial other can today 
be assumed by actors which are not directly linked to the colonial era such as the united 
States, the industrialised countries, transnational corporations or foreign non-governmental 
organisations (NGo).61‘The basic problem of world scenario today’, as India’s current PM 
Narendra Modi criticised for instance in 2008, ‘is that rich countries consider and dictate [to] 
the poor and underdeveloped countries as others. They should not dictate but should create 
structures where everyone’s voice is heard. … It is necessary to democratise the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as they do not have representatives from the 
developing countries’.62
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Though the West can assume the role of the colonial other in the post-Nehruvian dis-
course, the discourse has, at the same time, re-constituted the relationship between India 
and the West, and the uS in particular. The construction of a collective identity presupposes 
that there is a common other against which this commonality can be constituted. During 
the Cold War, the shared democratic credentials between India and the united States, for 
instance, ultimately proved to be insufficient for the construction of a collective identity, 
because the Western international community was constituted in opposition to the Soviet, 
communist other. The Nehruvian discourse, however, did not represent the communist, 
Soviet bloc as an antagonistic other that blocked or threatened India’s identity. In the post-
Cold War era, the West, by contrast, has re-produced its identity against the difference of 
Islamic fundamentalists and authoritarian regimes and thus against antagonistic others that 
are compatible with the economy of identity/difference in India’s foreign policy discourse. 
Designating the others which ‘block’ the realisation of a true world order, then-EAM yashwant 
Sinha noted in 2003: ‘Non-democratic regimes, fostering values of intolerance, fundamen-
talism, extremism and its favourite child – terrorism are certainly not the building blocks of 
world order. In fact, they are the biggest roadblocks to its attainment’.63
However, the resilience of the colonial other in the post-Nehruvian discourse makes the 
constitution of a collective identity between India and the West more difficult, because it 
highlights the difference between India – and its hybrid identity – as a post-colonial, devel-
oping democracy and the industrialised Western democracies whose affluence and domi-
nance in the world cannot be separated from their colonial and imperial past. This might 
also partially explain why Indian policymakers have been rather reluctant to associate India 
with the Western international community and instead assert India’s political autonomy and 
cultural distinctiveness. After all, it was the European colonial other against which India’s 
national identity was constituted and maintaining this difference is crucial for the re-pro-
duction of India’s identity and its role as an independent actor in international relations. As 
India’s former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal notes, ‘India does not want to be simply 
co-opted into the existing international order that is controlled by the west. It must find its 
due place in it in its own right and be in a position to change the rules rather than simply 
adhere to existing ones’.64
In addition to colonialism as temporal other, the post-Nehruvian discourse constructs 
India’s identity as a pluralist actor that can ‘align with all’ through a geopolitical differenti-
ation between the ‘inside’ – the Indian nation-state as the space of pluralism, diversity and 
syncretism, where different religious, ethnic and linguistic groups allegedly co-exist peace-
fully65 – and the ‘outside’ – the international system as a geopolitical space that features a 
similar plurality to India, but has not yet evolved a political order that provides for peaceful 
co-existence. By asserting that India has found a way for the peaceful contention of antag-
onisms, the discourse represents – the universal signifier – world order in accordance with 
India’s own – particular – experiences. The discourse simultaneously constructs the inter-
national system as a ‘threatening outside’, which challenges India’s pluralist identity, be it 
through inter-civilisational conflicts, religious fundamentalism or the demand to join par-
ticular power blocs (as during the Cold War), and also uses this ‘threatening outside’ as a 
common negation to re-produce the notion of India as an inherently pluralist country that 
can allegedly accommodate differences and therefore make an important contribution to 
world order.
190 T. WoJCZEWSKI
This ‘threatening outside’ is symbolised in the post-Nehruvian discourse by Pakistan and 
China in particular which serve as significant spatial-political others for the self-constitution 
of India as a pluralist, democratic and non-violent actor. Given Pakistan’s identity as a Muslim 
state on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory, the post-Nehruvian discourse constructs 
Pakistan as an antagonist that challenges India’s secular-pluralist state identity66 and, by 
extension, as the other that must be overcome to realise a political order in the spirit of 
(international) unity in diversity. While the presence of the Islamic and hostile Pakistan is a 
permanent reminder of India’s fragile nationhood and is constructed as an obstacle for the 
completion of India’s identity, it also allows the discourse to articulate the secular, pluralist, 
democratic and peaceful India as a superior actor that is set in opposition to the authoritarian, 
fundamentalist and militaristic Pakistan.67 This representation also appeals to Hindu-
nationalists in India who invoke India’s secular national identity to underscore India’s supe-
riority towards Pakistan and the inherent peacefulness and tolerance of Hinduism,68 which 
is contrasted with the ‘Muslim invasions’ of the Indian subcontinent, Islamist terrorism and 
Pakistan’s aggressions against India.
unlike Pakistan, which symbolises in many respects the antithesis to India, China is rep-
resented by the discourse in a more ambiguous way in the sense that China is both a rival 
and a partner, a challenge and an opportunity and a source of fear and of admiration. For 
the post-Nehruvian discourse, China’s size, its status as an ancient civilisation and the fastest 
growing economy in the world and its experience of imperialism mirror in many ways India’s 
own identity.69
The othering of China plays an important role in India’s self-constitution as an ‘emerging 
power’ in that it helps to maintain the legitimacy of the Indian state, its economic reforms, 
military modernisation and its assertion to play a more influential role in Asia and on the 
global level. on the one hand, the post-Nehruvian discourse suggests that India needs to 
emulate China’s economic and foreign policies and ‘emerge as [a] stronger, if not an equal, 
military and economic power’.70 on the other hand, the post-Nehruvian discourse differen-
tiates the ‘emergence’ of the democratic India from the ‘rise’ of the authoritarian China. In 
this process of othering, China is represented as an assertive and expansionist power, which 
oppresses internal dissent and displays hegemonic attitudes in Asia, while India is constituted 
as a benign, responsible and non-threatening power, which respects diversity and does not 
seek to dominate or bully other countries. As India’s preeminent strategic analyst and gov-
ernment adviser K. Subrahmanyam stated:
Whenever a major power emerges, the rest of the international system voices concerns about 
the aggressive nature of that power. … there is concern all over the world that a non-democratic 
China wants to become the untethered hegemon first of Asia, and then of the world. There are 
no such fears about India. … the emergence of India [is] greeted as a uniquely non-threatening 
phenomenon, unprecedented in history.71
‘unlike China’s rise’, Manmohan Singh agrees, ‘the rise of India does not cause any appre-
hensions. … The world takes a benign view of India. They want us to succeed’.72 By othering 
China, the post-Nehruvian discourse can represent India’s growing political, economic and 
strategic engagement and influence in its ‘extended neighbourhood’ as a natural expression 
of India’s legitimate interests, while China’s growing role in Asia and the Indian ocean indi-
cates that China might attempt to ‘resurrect its traditional and historical “Middle Kingdom” 
position of predominance’73 and seek hegemony in Asia.
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The post-Nehruvian discourse and Indian exceptionalism: fantasmatic logics
Having discussed the social and political logics underpinning the post-Nehruvian discourse 
and its conception of world order, we will now turn to the discourse’s fantasmatic logics. 
Against the backdrop of the purely relational character of identities and the resulting impos-
sibility of fully constituted identities, fantasies offer the illusion of completeness and iden-
tities that can be grounded on some stable foundations that define ‘who we are’ and thus 
our place in the world. The post-Nehruvian discourse, as argued here, features such a fantasy 
in the form of the notion of Indian Exceptionalism.
The idea of Indian Exceptionalism suggests that India is a unique symbol of tolerance, 
pluralism and peaceful co-existence and has the moral capacity for leadership in global 
politics. Constructivists, who have illuminated the nature, content and origins of this idea, 
argue that the notion of Indian Exceptionalism is a deep-seated identity source and has 
shaped Indian foreign policy until today.74 They derive the notion of exceptionalism from 
Partha Chatterjee’s reading of the colonial encounter and the formation of an Indian nation-
alist imaginary. Accordingly, confronted with the materially superior culture of the colonisers, 
India’s national leaders drew a distinction between an ‘inner’ and an ‘outer’ domain. While 
they largely acceded to the superiority of the West in the outer domain of statecraft, science 
and technology and thus sought to emulate the West in those areas, they asserted the 
superiority of India, and the East in general, in the inner domain of culture, morality and 
spirituality that must be preserved and protected from the West.75 While this account of 
Indian Exceptionalism can show how the colonial encounter shaped India’s identity forma-
tion and how India’s national leaders simultaneously sought to emulate and repudiate 
Western modernity, it ultimately essentialises colonialism and India’s identity by reducing 
the latter to the colonial encounter. In addition, this account can explain neither why strong 
notions of exceptionalism can also be found in countries which were not victims of colo-
nialism (eg Russia) or whose colonial experience was significantly different (eg the united 
States),76 nor why the notion exceptionalism has proved to be so resilient in India.
By excavating the content of the notion of Indian Exceptionalism on the basis of India’s 
official foreign policy rhetoric and studying how this notion has shaped Indian foreign policy, 
constructivist studies run the risk of providing an account of Indian foreign policy in which 
India appears to be an obsessively ‘moralist’, ‘different’, ‘ambivalent’ and ‘peaceful’ nation-state. 
For example, in order to show that the notion of Indian Exceptionalism shapes Indian foreign 
policy, Chacko cites statements by Indira Gandhi which depict ‘India as a moral actor’ and 
justify India’s increasing involvement in Sri lanka in the 1980s on moral grounds.77 Instead 
of pointing out that political leaders in almost every country in the world have used moral 
arguments to justify wars and interventions, Chacko seems to suggest that such behaviour 
would be unique to India.
In contrast to constructivism, a poststructuralist reading of Indian Exceptionalism is less 
concerned with the question whether India really is an ‘exceptional power’ or how this notion 
shapes Indian foreign policy, and rather with how and why India is constructed or repre-
sented as one. This perspective is informed by poststructuralism’s relational ontology which 
postulates that subjects have no essence or stable identities, but are constructed by dis-
courses which relate differences to confer meaning. While the discussion of political logics 
in the previous section has shown how India’s identity has been constituted against the 
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difference of various others, the conceptualisation of Indian Exceptionalism as fantasy shows 
how the post-Nehruvian discourse seeks to conceal the missing fullness of the Indian identity 
by attributing it an imaginary timeless essence and linearity. In other words, the fantasy 
symbolises the myth about the founding history of India and seeks to obscure that India – 
like any other nation – is an imagined community, whose identity cannot be grounded on 
a stable or natural foundation and is thus in permanent need of re-production. The fantas-
matic narrative represents India as ‘a fundamentally “open” society’ that ‘has learnt to accom-
modate and assimilate over the ages’ and ‘received and absorbed major influences from 
outside, like Islam and Christianity, and radiated cultural influences, outward’ in ‘the spirit of 
peace, co-existence and tolerance’.78
The narrative, which emerged during India’s independence struggle, was most compel-
lingly told by Jawaharlal Nehru in his Discovery of India, in which India’s past, as Sunil Khilnani 
notes, is ‘told as a tale of cultural mixing and fusion, a civilizational tendency towards unifi-
cation that would realize itself within the frame of a modern nation state’.79 The fantasmatic 
narrative constructs India as a civilisational state, whose origin can be traced back to the 
Aryan-Vedic high culture that symbolised a period of purity, unity, co-existence, prosperity 
and glory. By grounding Indian identity in an immemorial past and ancient culture, the 
fantasy provides the Self with a seemingly transcendental foundation and an eternal imag-
inary essence. It then traces this alleged essence throughout India’s past by establishing a 
kind of organic link between Buddha, the ancient emperor Ashoka, who turned to Buddhism 
and became the ‘messenger’ of non-violence, the Mughal emperor Akbar, who is praised for 
developing a tolerant and impartial strand of Islam, and Mahatma Gandhi, who became the 
symbol of India’s successful non-violent struggle for independence.
The post-Nehruvian discourse incorporated this foundational narrative of India by rep-
resenting the globalising, post-Cold War world and the changes in India’s foreign and eco-
nomic policy (eg economic liberalisation and policy of multi-alignment) as being in keeping 
with Indian identity and thereby providing the Indian Self a ‘foundational guarantee’ in times 
of change and uncertainty. As then-EAM S. M. Krishna noted in 2012:
As our world is globalizing, our societies and communities are becoming more diverse. We now 
have unprecedented possibilities to spread prosperity, but we are also bound deeply by shared 
vulnerabilities. … As a pluralist democracy that stands at the cultural cross-roads of Asia and 
many of its fault lines, India will serve as a bridge across the region’s – and, indeed, the world’s 
– great diversity.80
While this idea of India as a nation-state which is not based on a common language, 
culture or religion but forged in diversity has a universal aspiration and significance in that 
it postulates that there is no contradiction between political order and diversity, it has been 
challenged by events and phenomena that exceed this discursive representation of India: 
the violent partition of British India, separatist movements within India, communal violence 
or India’s inability to establish cordial relations with most of its South Asian neighbours which 
predominantly view India as a ‘regional bully’.81 Through the fantasmatic narrative of Indian 
Exceptionalism, the post-Nehruvian discourse can present these phenomena as anomalies 
in a long history of peaceful co-existence and mask over the essential incompleteness of 
Indian identity by projecting this lack onto various others: the British colonial rulers, the 
irredentist Pakistan or the ‘hegemonistic’ China that is blamed for ‘wooing away’ South Asian 
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countries and undermining India’s goodwill in the region.82 By scapegoating a range of 
others, the discourse can preserve a close link between India’s identity and foreign policy 
and prevent a dislocation of this identity.
Conclusion
Drawing on a poststructuralist, discourse theoretical framework, this article de- and recon-
structed the conception of world order in India’s dominant foreign policy discourse in the 
post-Cold War era. It sought to contribute to a ‘Post-Western IR’ by analysing Indian textual 
sources and the understandings of world order constituted therein. At the same time, the 
article sought to go beyond the contextualised self-interpretations of Indian policymakers 
and avoid an essentialist, Indo-centric conception of world politics by employing ‘theoretical 
concepts and logics not readily available to social actors themselves’83 that enable us to 
illuminate (1) what understandings of Indian identity and world order exist in the discourse 
(social logics); (2) how these meanings are (re-)produced by relating the Indian Self to inter-
national others (political logics); and (3) why a particular discourse appeals to subjects by 
offering a sense of wholeness through a fantasmatic narrative that endows India with a 
perpetual, imaginary essence and thereby masks over the incompleteness of India’s identity 
(fantasmatic logics).
India’s dominant foreign policy discourse takes polycentrism as the essential feature of 
world order and represents India as pluralist, multi-aligned actor that can and should engage 
all major powers. The article argued that the discourse has used foreign policy and world 
order as sites for the re-production of a particular representation of Indian identity: India is 
a secular, pluralist nation-state that can in both its internal and external affairs accommodate 
differences. By representing world order in accordance with India’s national experiences and 
asserting that India has found an institutional framework for peaceful co-existence, the 
discourse seeks to heave India to a position from which it can represent the universal: the 
ideal of a global political community. Hence, similar to the discourses of Western actors, the 
Indian foreign policy discourse attributes universal significance to its particular experiences 
and identity and thereby attempts to place India in the centre of a multipolar world order. 
However, the very constitution of India as an actor that can accommodate differences 
depends on difference, thus exposing the limits of India’s identity. The rise to power of the 
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi, who contests India’s plu-
ralist and secular credentials, is the latest embodiment of this lack and shows that India – like 
any other nation – has no essence, but is constituted by competing discourses that seek to 
hegemonise a particular meaning of Indian-ness.
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